State of Play: The Quid Pro Quo Game

With the release of a shortened text that simplifies the options still on the table, climate negotiations are moving along in Paris. It is expected that a final version will be adopted by the conference’s close.

Civil society groups wasted no time calling for increased ambition and emphasising that important decisions still needed to be made. Hundreds of protesters gathered in the conference centre to stage a ‘sit-in’ to protest arrangements in the new text that shirk developed world responsibility.

Alden Meyer of the Union of Concerned Scientists pointed out that there were still gaps that need to be resolved in “the agreement on [its] core political issues—the long-term goal, review and revision of INDCs, transparency, loss and damage, and finance.”

Coming out of the G77 meeting, The Verb learnt that most groups will be able to “live with the text” even though there are specific areas still lacking in ambition or rigour. Most parties were fairly united in calling it a good basis for the negotiation to continue, while also acknowledging that hard decisions were ahead.

If the deadline that conference president Fabius has set is honoured, the time for wheeling and dealing is over. Hard decisions must be made, which will result in inevitable compromise. This was always coming, and now it can be delayed no longer. 

Developing countries will be expected to help pay

The defining question of the conference–who pays for it all–is shaping up as a compromise between developed and developing countries.

There are three options on the table. The weakest would require “all parties” to mobilise climate finance “from a wide variety of sources, public and private” and according to “evolving responsibilities and capabilities”. This option is likely to be shot down by the G77 as violating the terms of the convention, which explicitly stipulates developed countries will assist developing. Language around “evolving” and “capabilities” is also seen to shift pressure onto emerging markets such as China, India and Brazil to contribute.

The strongest option requires “developed country parties and other parties” to commit to financing “beyond their previous efforts”. This option would require developed countries to commit to follow through on the promised floor of US$100bn by 2020, and a scale-up post-2020.

Perhaps because of its vagueness, the language that is likely to appear in the final agreement requires developed countries to “take the lead”, with developing countries supplementing on a “voluntary, complimentary basis” particularly through South-South cooperation as China has been doing.

The long-term goal could still be anything

A key surprise of the Paris talks has been the emergence of the 1.5°C as the touted long-term warming upper limit. Now with the majority of countries supporting it, the text contains options for both 1.5°C or the more well established 2°C as the long-term goal, as well as what appears to be a compromise position that incorporates both. A goal of 1.5°C has strong support, but the tradeoffs for it to be unanimous may be too comparatively great.

In terms of a goal around emissions, there are two options. The strongest requires cuts of 70-95 per cent below 2010 levels by 2050, before achieving “net zero” emissions by the end of the century. The weaker option refers to a “collective aim” of a “long term low emissions transformation”. The difference between these two options cannot be overstated.

The science tells us that the date of decarbonisation is not the important goal, it is the total amount of emissions produced before decarbonisation happens. Stronger language of 70-95 per cent cuts by 2050 could represent a real chance of staying below, or at least very close to, the so called ‘carbon budget’. A “low emissions transformation”, however, is unlikely to achieve this.

Photo courtesy of Arnaud Bouissou, MEDDE. For more analysis on the potential outcomes of COP21, check out The Verb’s Negotiation Compass.